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This paper uses new data that combines information on workers’ education 
and earnings trajectories with information about their firms to estimate the 
costs of job displacement in Brazil. We find that high-tenure workers 
displaced from their firms during mass lay-offs suffer a long-term loss in 
monthly wages of about 20% per year. We show that this result is robust to 
different treatment of workers that leave the formal sector of the economy and 
is driven by the losses suffered by more educated individuals working in big 
firms at the time of displacement. We conclude that the displacement effects 
are the result of a combination of the depreciation of firm-specific human 








1) Introduction   2
           Job reallocation is extremely high in Brazil in comparison to many other countries 
(see Ribeiro et al, 2003). If firm-specific human capital is important, then reallocation can 
very costly to workers and firms.  In this paper we examine the costs of displacement for 
the Brazilian workers and try to relate these costs with firm-specific human capital models.  
            According to some models, employer-specific human capital exists and is a possible 
explanation for long-term employment relationships. To the extent that the match between 
the worker and the firm has a productivity component that is of no value to either the 
worker or the firm outside their relationship, then the worker will have a decline in 
productivity when he randomly switches firms. Moreover, in this case the probability of job 
loss will decline with tenure (Farber, 1999).  
            Many reasons can account for the existence of specific capital. It could reflect the 
existence of skills that are only useful to specific employers, due to past on-the-job 
investments (Becker, 1975) or to investments in searching for a good match (Jovanovic, 
1979).  Alternatively, firm wage premiums may exist because of unionization (Lewis, 
1986) or efficiency wage (Stiglitz, 1974) considerations. Any of these theories are 
consistent with a drop in wages following a change in jobs.  
            The negative relationship between tenure and the probability of job changes and 
between wages and jobs changes could also be explained by other reasons, related to 
unobserved firm level and worker level heterogeneity. If there are persistent differences in 
firms with respect to volatility in labor demand, then the ones with less volatility will be 
more likely to invest more in specific capital, to have high-tenure workers and less likely to 
lay workers off. Moreover, if there are good jobs and bad jobs for a random worker, the 
                                                                                                                                                     
1 I would like to thank without implicating, John Haltinwanger, Adriana Kugler, Alexandro Micco and Carmen Pages for detailed 
comments and Edgar CB and Gilmar Santos for excellent research assistance. 
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good jobs will pay higher wages and have higher tenure, because of lower quits. This 
would also imply a sharper wage decline for the high-tenure workers when they change 
jobs, since both the high and the low-tenure workers are expected to receive the average 
wage in the new job (Farber, 1999). 
               On the worker’s side, when it is time to lay off workers, firms may select, among 
the high-tenure, the ones with lower productivity/wage relationships. Kletzer (1989) 
suggests that a positive correlation between tenure in the previous job and the level of 
wages in the new job would be evidence in favor of the heterogeneity explanation, since 
high and low-tenure (but equally productive) workers would be expected to receive the 
same wage in the new job in expectation. Any systematic differences in the level of wages 
will be related to unobserved heterogeneity correlated with tenure. 
             There is plenty of evidence for the United States that changes in jobs are negatively 
related to changes in wages. Perhaps the most cited work is Jacobson et al (1993). In this 
study, the authors use administrative data on Pennsylvanian workers to compare pre and 
post-displacement earnings of high-tenure displaced workers with those of workers that 
remained in the same firm. By focusing on workers that remained attached to the labor 
market after massive lay-offs, they find that high tenure workers suffer substantial earning 
losses when they leave their jobs. 
             The main criticism to their work is that the displaced workers begin to experience 
earnings losses even before they were laid off. This means that firms might be selectively 
laying off employees whose performance was unusually poor before the time of separation. 
The authors themselves state that  “the incidence of temporary layoffs increased for these 
workers before their final separation (p.698)”. This favors the heterogeneity explanation for 
the drop in earnings following job changes, as oppose to the specific capital argument.   4
                     In  the  following  sections we use a sample of Brazilian formal sector 
employees to investigate their labor market transitions and the changes in wages associated 
with job changes between 1992 and 1998. We firstly intend to describe the changes and 
then focus on a specific sample of displaced workers, to gauge the long-term impact of job 
changes on wages. The mains advantage of our study is that our data set has information on 
education, and so we will be able to distinguish, for the first time in the literature, the costs 
of displacement for skilled and unskilled workers and therefore be able to shed more light 




The data set used is the Relação Anual de Informações Sociais (RAIS – Annual 
Social Information Report), carried out annually by the Ministério do Trabalho e Emprego 
(MTE – Labor Ministry). It is an administrative report filed by all tax registered Brazilian 
establishments. The information is collected in the first quarter, referring to the previous 
year, and it covers the whole country. The data covers approximately two million 
establishments and twenty four million workers, on average, every year. The unit of 
observation is an establishment/workplace, be it an individual enterprise or a branch or 
plant of a large firm. All tax registered enterprises receive a unique tax number, the CNPJ. 
The CNPJ is different for different workplaces/establishments from a single firm. This 
identifier is used to pool the cross-sections. 
Since all businesses should file the RAIS report, there is no lower bound on 
establishment size. On the other hand, since the RAIS information may be used for inquiries   5
about labor legislation compliance, businesses that do not comply with it tend to not to file 
in RAIS. Thus, RAIS may be considered a census of the formal Brazilian labor market.
2 We 
understand the formal sector as tax and social security registered establishments only. 
            As our data represent the whole population of formal sector firms in Brazil, to keep 
the sample within a manageable size, in this paper we will focus only on the individuals 
working in the state of São Paulo, which accounts for about 40% of Brazilian GDP. 
Moreover, we will focus on a specific demographic group, namely men, aged between 24 
and 39 and living in the metropolitan region. We prefer to do this because, as this is one of 
the first studies on the costs of displacement in Latin America, we intend to get a good idea 
of the results in the group with strong labor market attachment, before extending the 
analysis to other demographic groups. 
For the purpose of this paper we collected data in the following way. One sub-
sample is composed of workers that were continuously employed in the same firm from 
1991 to 1998. To construct the other sub-sample, of displaced workers, we focused on 
workers who separated from their firms in Dec/93, Dec/94 or Dec/95.  Our data set contains 
information on average yearly wages and on December wages for each worker. However, 
because of the extremely high inflation that took place in Brazil the 1980s and 1990s, 
average monthly nominal wages do not bring any useful information. Therefore, we had to 
use only December wages to compute pre-displacement wages. Our final sample had 
33,080 continuing workers and 82,910 workers that separated form their firms. 
The main variables we will use from the RAIS survey are education (4 schooling 
levels), age (two levels), tenure, sector of activity and establishment size. Although we do 
                                                 
2 State owned enterprises, public administration and non-profit organizations are also required to file the report.   6
have information on the reasons for the separation, we will not use it the exercises below, 
since in Brazil workers that are dismissed have access to a forced savings account called 
FGTS (Fundo de Garantia por Tempo de Serviço). Therefore, they have every incentive to 
make an informal agreement with their firms, so that they “pretend” to have fired them, 
when in fact they quitted. This makes the information on the reason for separation full of 
measurement error. Moreover, we do not have this information for about 50% of workers in 
our sample. 
   With the establishment identification number (CNPJ) it is possible to follow all 
establishments that file the RAIS survey over time. Moreover, with the worker’s national 
insurance number (PIS), it is also possible to follow all workers that remain in the formal 
sector over time and to match the workers’ characteristics with those of the establishments, 
through RAIS. Therefore, we can form a panel that matches workers to their establishments 
and follows each of them over time.  
 
2.1 - Transitions 
                We now describe the patterns of the transitions observed in the São Paulo labor 
market from 1992 to 1998. Figure 1 describes the changes in status observed for prime age 
males that were employed in December of the base year.
3 One can note that in 1992/93 
about 50% of these employees were employed in the same firm one year later (EEsf), while 
30% were employed in a different firm (EEdf) and 20% were out of the formal sector. One 
can also note that, despite very marked cyclical fluctuations, there is no well-defined trend 
in the sample period concerning these transitions 
                                                 
3 On average, we were able to match about 80% of workers from one year to the other.   7
            Brazilian labor market seems to be segmented along tenure and education lines. 
Figure 2 confirms this, by plotting the percentage of employees that remained employed (in 
the same firm or not) over time by education group. One can clearly see that the transitions 
are highly related to education. Among the individuals with college education (4), the 
percentage that remain employed one year later reached 85% and it varies little over time, 
while among the lowest education group (1), the share in employment in the formal sector 
reaches 70% in 1995/96, but it varies substantially over time.  
             What  about  the  relationship between tenure and transitions? According to the 
specific capital models briefly described above, the probability of being laid off should 
decrease with tenure. Figure 3 shows that is indeed the case. Workers that are at least two 
years with the same employee are about 25% more likely to remain employed one year 
latter than those with tenure lower than two. This pattern is remarkably constant over the 
economic cycle. Additional exercises (not shown) show that among the high-tenured 
employees, the probability of remaining in the same firm is about 60%, whereas for the 
low-tenured ones it ranges around 30%. 
 
2.2 - The Informal Sector 
    The main drawback of the RAIS dataset however, is that it only covers workers 
that are currently employed in the formal sector of the Brazilian economy. Therefore, if the 
individual moves to the informal sector or becomes unemployed, we loose track of her. 
This means that we will not be able to discriminate between transitions to (and from) 
unemployment, employment in the informal sector or out of the labor force and we do not 
know the wages of the individuals that transit to the informal sector.    8
   In order to try and give a complete picture of transitions in Brazilian labor market, 
we briefly explore another data set to this analysis, the Pesquisa Mensal de Emprego – 
(PME - Monthly Employment Survey), a monthly household survey covering six 
metropolitan regions, also conducted by IBGE (Brazilian Census Bureau), that interviews 
about 38,500 households every month. The main feature of this data set is that each 
individual household member is interviewed for two periods of four consecutive months, 
with an interval of 8 months between the two periods. This means that PME follows all 
individuals living in the same household for a total period of 16 months.  
The main drawback of the data is that if the individual is working in the 4
th and 5
th 
interview (four months apart), we do not know whether she is in the same job, since we do 
not know her tenure in the present job. We can know, by looking at the occupation, sector 
of activity and formality status before and after the interval, whether the individual has 
changed jobs, but we can never be sure if she is in the same job or not, conditionally on 
being employment in both periods. Therefore, we have to rely on RAIS to identify wages 
changes associated with job changes. 
In order to draw a comparison with our previous results, we will use only a sub-
sample consisting of men, aged between 24 and 39 and working in São Paulo. Figure 4 
shows that in 1992, about 25% of employed workers in the formal sector transited out of it 
in the following year, which is remarkably consistent with the percentage in figure 1.
4 The 
figure also show that among those the left the formal sector, about 10% became 
unemployed or left the labor force and 15% moved to the informal sector. 
                                                 
4 The difference between the transitions out of the formal sector in RAIS (30%) and PME (25%) could be related to firm level attrition in the 
Rais data set, so that workers may  have remained in the formal sector working in firms that did not fill in the questionnaire.   9
It is important to note that we do not observe the wages of those workers that move 
out of the formal sector after being displaced. Therefore, we will be assigning missing 
values to the wages of these workers. In order to deal with the possibility of selection bias 
in the regressions below, we will compare the results of the regression that uses the whole 
sample of displaced workers with those obtained after dropping the workers that never 
reappear in the formal sector after being displaced, and when we use only workers that are 
employed for the whole period in the formal sector after being displaced. These exercises 
should give us estimates of lower bounds around the real costs of displacement.  
 
2.3 - Descriptive Statistics 
              Table 1 reports summary statistics on the main variables to be used in the exercises 
below for the sample of high-tenured workers (more than 3 years in the same firm), and 
also compares the characteristics of the workers displaced during mass lay-offs, that is, at 
periods when their firm displaced more than 15% of their work-force, with workers that 
continued in the same firm throughout the sample period. We present statistics for the 
displaced workers before, at and after displacement actually took place.  
                One  can  notice  firstly that average December wages and skill proportion 
(percentage of workers with more than fundamental education) are much higher in the 
sample of continuing workers. However, in the regressions below we will control for 
worker specific effects, which will capture any systematic difference between continuing 
and displaced workers that are fixed over time. Moreover, it is important to note that the 
skill proportion among displaced workers has remained relatively stable before and after 
displacement, which indicates that movements into the informal sector or unemployed does   10
not seem to be strongly correlated with education
5. The proportion of older workers (those 
with more than 29 years of age) is increasing over time, which is not surprising. With 
respect to the sector of activity, we cannot observe any marked differences in its 
distribution between displaced and continuing workers nor before and after displacement. 
 









Wages (BR$)  1,101 1,121  1,190  1,507 
Skilled  0.24 0.24  0.23  0.37 
Older  0.73 0.81  0.85  0.81 
Services  0.31 0.28  0.28  0.28 
Agriculture  0.12 0.12  0.12  0.15 
Manufacturing  0.32 0.33  0.29  0.36 
Retail  0.16 0.17  0.18  0.14 
Construction  0.07 0.07  0.10  0.06 
 
                    Table 2 reports the results of traditional (log) wage regressions on dummy 
variables indicating size, age, education and tenure, in the periods before displacement, for 
both displaced and continuing workers polled together. The aim of these regressions is to 
find out the relative importance of tenure on wage determination in Brazil and to verify 
which firm and workers characteristics are more importantly associated with tenure, to set 
the ground for the specifications of the displacement regressions below. 
 
                Table 2 – Wages, Human Capital and Size: 1991/1992 
                                                 
5 The differences in the summary statistics before and at displacement are due to the composition of the sample of displaced workers, since   11
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
        
Tenure  0.141 0.096 0.099 0.026  -0.032 
  0.011 0.017 0.029 0.017  0.032 
Education  0.427 0.391 0.428 0.424  0.399 
  0.011 0.016 0.011 0.011  0.016 
Age  0.312 0.312 0.293 0.312  0.158 
  0.015 0.015 0.019 0.015  0.016 
Size  0.256 0.255 0.256 0.155  0.298 
  0.011 0.011 0.011 0.016  0.019 
Tenure* Education - 0.075 -  -  0.054 
   0.022     0.022 
Tenure* Age  - -  0.048  -  0.036 
     0.031    0.031 
Tenure*size  - - -  0.208  0.202 
      0.023  0.023 
N  18,884 18,884 18,884 18,884  18,884 
 
                The results in column (1) show that tenure (defined as being in the same firm for 
3 years or more) is indeed important for wage determination, as are education, age and 
size
6. The interaction between tenure and education is estimated to be positive and 
significant in column (2), which means that the general and the specific forms of human 
capital are high correlated. However, the interaction of tenure with age is not precisely 
estimated in column (3). In column (4) one can note that tenure is much more important in 
bigger firms, defined as those with more than 50 workers, the median firm size in our 
sample. This suggests that firm-specific human capital is more important in bigger firms, 
                                                                                                                                                     
not all of the workers are observed three years before displacement. 
6 It is difficult to compare the magnitude of the coefficients, as they are very dependent on how we define the dummy variables. We do not 
have continuous measures of years of schooling and age.   12
and that the firm size wage premium increases with tenure. W must be interpret these 
results with a little bit of care, though, since we are not controlling for worker specific 
effects so far.  In column (5) we include all the interactions at the same time and confirm 
the previous results that tenure is only important for more educated individual working in 
bigger firms.   
       
3- Results 
3.1 - The Costs of Displacement  
             We now move on to make an evaluation of the costs of displacement in Brazil.              
Figure 5 shows the behavior, between 1991 and 1998, of the mean December wage of the 
high tenured workers that were displaced in a “mass-lay off” in 1993 and compares it with 
the wages of the workers that remained employed in the same firm for the whole period. 
While the wages of the non-displaced workers (control group) rose by around R$500 
(U$200) between from 1991 to 1998, the wages of displaced workers basically fell ay about 
R$300. Moreover, it is evident that the major dip in the real wages of displaced workers 
occurred one years after displacement took place. In what follows, we will subject this 
finding to more detailed econometric investigation. 
          The basic specification we will estimate is as in Jacobson et al (1993): 
                                  it k
k
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  where  it y  is the logarithm of the worker December wage,  i α  is the worker specific effect, 






it D is a vector of displacement dummies that range from 3   13
years before displacement takes place to 5 years after that, and  it ε  is an idiosyncratic shock. 
In some specifications, we will include worker-specific time trends in the regression and we 
will do many exercises on selected sub-samples.  
                  Table  3  compares  the coefficients of the displacement dummies for two 
different samples, one with the workers that were employed in the same firm for three years 
or more, and another with workers that were less than three years in the firm. We present 
the results in a table so that the reader can gauge the size of the standard errors, but we also 
present a picture of the displacement effects in figure 6.   
             The results are quite impressive. For the sample of low-tenured workers, the wages 
of displaced workers start falling two years before displacement actually takes place 
(relative to the wages of continuing low-tenure workers), reaching the bottom level one 
year after displacement and converging to a 10% fall with respect to the initial period. It 
seems that low tenured workers are basically switching jobs all the time, and are thus 
unable to establish long term relationships with their firms and gain from “on the job 
training”. 
                   Amongst  the  high-tenured  workers,  wages  of  displaced  workers  remain 
statistically the same as the wages of continuing workers until the time of displacement. 
However, one year after displacement their wages drop by as much as 50%, recovering 
after that to reach a level 30% below pre-displacement levels. One should note that we 
cannot predict which workers are going to be displaced on the basis of their pre-
displacement wages, as if displacement occurred randomly.  
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             Up  to  this  stage,  however,  we  were  not  focusing  specifically  on  workers  that 
separated from their firms during mass-lay offs. We do this in figure 7, where we note that 
workers displaced during mass lay-offs suffer a lower reduction in wages (with respect to 
continuing workers) than workers that separated during “normal” times. This results 
suggest that last kind of workers were being selectively laid-off, perhaps on the basis of  a 
wages/productivity ratio and thus suffered a bit more than the ones that we laid-off in a 
period when their firms were facing difficulties. 
             If we now turn our attention to the mass lay-off sample, the results suggest that 
those workers that lost their jobs were not able to recover their average real wages, even 5 
years after displacement took place. Since their pre-displacement wages were very close to   15
the continuing workers’, this is strong evidence in favor of the firm specific capital 
hypothesis, as opposed to worker heterogeneity. 
                  Figure 8 presents some robustness tests related to the treatment of workers that 
move out of the formal sector. The first exercise was to include a variable indicating the 
number of years from displacement that elapsed before the displaced worker reappeared in 
the formal sector. The results were basically the same as in the baseline (high tenured- mass 
lay off) specification. We then excluded the workers that never reappear in the formal 
sector again after displacement, which raises a little bit the wages of displaced workers, 
before and after displacement. Finally, we used a balanced panel, that is, only the workers 
that we continuously employed in the formal sector. This may be considered as a lower 
bound estimate of the effects of displacement, as it neglects its unemployment and informal 
employment effects. The resulting displacement effects were indeed lower, but displaced 
workers still earn about 20% less than the continuing ones. This last exercise reduces the 
sample of displaced workers by a significant amount and so we will proceed with the 
estimation using the unbalanced panel, but controlling for years since reappearance and 
dropping those that never reappear in the formal sector. 
                    Figure  9  compares  the displacement effects of the specifications with and 
without worker-specific trends in wages.
7 Because of the degrees of freedom that are lost in 
computing the worker-specific trends, we could include only four post-displacement 
dummies. The results look similar to the fixed effects regressions, but because we are 
netting out any trend in wages, we can observe a rise in pre-displacement wages before and 
after displacement, with real wages returning to pre-displacement levels four years after 
                                                 
7 Computationally this is done by regressing, for each worker, each of the displacement and time dummies on a time trend, computing the 
residuals from these regressions, which are then used, instead of the original dummies, in the OLS regression, without the worker fixed effects 
(see Jacobson et al,1993).    16
displacement. This could mean that the permanent reduction in wages observed in our 
original specification could in fact be driven by a worker-specific downward trend in 
wages, occurring independently of displacement. However, we prefer to take this result 
with caution, since our sample period is not big enough to be able to differentiate short term 
from long-term effects of displacement. Therefore, in the following exercises we will 
continue to use the specifications without worker-specific time trend. 
 
3.2 – Firm Specific Human Capital or just Good Firms?  
             When  a  worker  separates  from  her  previous  employers,  what  exactly  is  she 
loosing?  As we saw in the introduction, many reasons could explain a drop in wages 
following a change in jobs. Our maintained assumption is that wage reduction is the effect 
of depreciation of firm-specific human capital. Let us now try to test this hypothesis. 
           We first examine the effects of displacement in two different samples, one with less 
and the other with more educated workers (defined as having achieve more than 
fundamental education). If there is a correlation between the general and the specific forms 
of human capital (as we observed in the levels regressions above), we expect that the costs 
of displacement will be higher for more educated workers. Figure 10 shows that this indeed 
the case. In the sample of less educated workers, relative wages rise a little bit before 
displacement, then fall about 20% one year after, and return to pre-displacement levels 
three years after displacement. For the more educated workers, however, wages remain 
about 30% lower that their counterparts that remain in the same firm, even 5 years after 
displacement! Therefore we cannot reject the specificity human capital hypothesis.   17
                    We saw in the introduction that other reasons could explain the relationship 
between wages and changes in job. For example, if there are “good jobs” and “bad jobs” for 
a random worker, then the good jobs will pay higher wages and have higher tenure, because 
of lower quits (Farber, 1999). We saw in the levels regressions above that bigger firms tend 
to pay higher wages in Brazil, and so we will proxy a good job with a job in a big firms 
(with more than 50 employees). Figure 11 shows that the costs of displacement are indeed 
much higher for workers that separated from big firms, ranging between 30% and 40% 
after three years, while for workers of smaller firms, the costs converged to about 8% per 
month, but not always significantly different from zero. 
                     However, we also saw above that bigger firms also have a steeper wage-tenure 
relationship.  How can we differentiate between the loss of a good job and the depreciation 
of firm specific human capital? One way is to look only at the individuals working in big 
firms and compare the costs of displacement between those that changed to a smaller firm 
with those that moved to a bigger firm. Figure 12 does just that and one can see that the 
costs of displacement are indeed higher for workers that switched to a smaller firm, perhaps 
reflecting the added effects of the loss of a good job and of capital. More importantly, the 
costs are still significant for those workers that switched to another big firm, stabilizing at 
20% per year after 5 years. This can be considered as the effect of the loss of firm-specific 
human capital, net of the “good jobs” effect. 
            Figures 13 and 14 compare the effects of displacement in small and big firms for 
workers of different levels of education. Figure 13 shows that even in the big firms the 
effects are much more persistent for the more educated workers. In the case of individuals 
working in small firms, figure 14 shows that the short-term effect of a job loss is much 
stronger among the less educated, but that the long-term effects are basically the same.   18
          It is important to examine whether the effects verified above are observed in all 
sector of the economy or are driven by the behavior in some specific sectors. The results of 
this exercise are presented in figure 16.  It is clear that there are substantial differences in 
the costs of displacement among sectors. They are higher and more persistent for the 
services and retail sector, intermediate and shorter in the manufacturing and agriculture, 
and pretty low in retail. Figure 17 then shows that the effects of displacement are higher for 
those individuals that change the sector of employment, but not significantly so. 
 
4- Conclusions 
                 In this study, we investigate the changes in wages associated with changes in 
jobs, that is, the costs of displacement. We focused on a sample of formal male workers, 
aged between 24 and 39 and living in the metropolitan area of São Paulo. We find that 
around 30% of the workers move out of the formal sector after a year, and that about 20% 
change jobs in the same period. Among those workers that leave the formal sector, about 
15% enter the informal sector and 15% become unemployed or leave the labor force. These 
transitions are strongly associated with individual characteristics, especially education and 
tenure. 
              There are substantial wage changes associated with these transitions. A displaced 
worker experiences on average a reduction of 20% in December wages per year, even five 
years after displacement. We show that this result is robust to different treatment of 
workers that leave the formal sector of the economy and is driven by the losses suffered by 
more educated individuals working in big firms at the time of displacement. We conclude   19
that the displacement effects are the result of a combination of the depreciation of firm-
specific human capital and the loss of a “good job”. 
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